posted June 08, 2005 09:56 AM            

This is an argument you are not going to win. You have attempted to introduce the concepts here, either directly or indirectly that; the US is guilty of stirring up terrorists and therefore responsible for the terrorist attacks..I would imagine also responsible for terrorist attacks on Iraqi civilians; that the US has oppressed and repressed the Iraqi people; that terrorists are fighting for their homeland....against their own people who voted at a 70% turnout rate for their own government..noble cause!!!; that terrorists are really super warriors because they have no problem killing people they don't know...really ballsy; that the US was responsible for the operation of the oil for food program to adequately feed, clothe and provide medical care/medicines for the Iraqi people and that the US Congress...America's representatives, had no concern for the Iraqi people prior to WMD not being found in Iraq.

The following Congressional Resolution is from 1998. In this resolution, the Congress expressly states the US should provide immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people once Saddam Hussein is removed...and also debt relief assistance for Saddam's excesses.

H.R.4655
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))

Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress

H.R.4655
Public Law: 105-338 (10/31/98)
SPONSOR: Rep Gilman (introduced 09/29/98)
RELATED BILLS: S.2525

SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.

It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime. http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm

posted June 09, 2005 12:35 PM              

Waleed Al Shehri left the US a year ago, he says

Another of the men named by the FBI as a hijacker in the suicide attacks on Washington and New York has turned up alive and well.

The identities of four of the 19 suspects accused of having carried out the attacks are now in doubt.

Saudi Arabian pilot Waleed Al Shehri was one of five men that the FBI said had deliberately crashed American Airlines flight 11 into the World Trade Centre on 11 September.

His photograph was released, and has since appeared in newspapers and on television around the world.

Hijacking suspects
Flight 175: Marwan Al-Shehhi, Fayez Ahmed, Mohald Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi and Ahmed Alghamdi

Flight 11: Waleed M Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, Abdulaziz Alomari and Satam Al Suqami

Flight 77: Khalid Al-Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaq Alhamzi, Salem Alhamzi and Hani Hanjour

Flight 93: Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Ziad Jarrahi and Saeed Alghamdi

Now he is protesting his innocence from Casablanca, Morocco.

He told journalists there that he had nothing to do with the attacks on New York and Washington, and had been in Morocco when they happened. He has contacted both the Saudi and American authorities, according to Saudi press reports.

He acknowledges that he attended flight training school at Daytona Beach in the United States, and is indeed the same Waleed Al Shehri to whom the FBI has been referring.

But, he says, he left the United States in September last year, became a pilot with Saudi Arabian airlines and is currently on a further training course in Morocco.

Mistaken identity

Abdulaziz Al Omari, another of the Flight 11 hijack suspects, has also been quoted in Arab news reports.

Abdelaziz Al Omari 'lost his passport in Denver'
He says he is an engineer with Saudi Telecoms, and that he lost his passport while studying in Denver.

Another man with exactly the same name surfaced on the pages of the English-language Arab News.

The second Abdulaziz Al Omari is a pilot for Saudi Arabian Airlines, the report says.

Meanwhile, Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, a London-based Arabic daily, says it has interviewed Saeed Alghamdi.

Khalid Al-Midhar may also be alive

He was listed by the FBI as a hijacker in the United flight that crashed in Pennsylvania.

And there are suggestions that another suspect, Khalid Al Midhar, may also be alive.

FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged on Thursday that the identity of several of the suicide hijackers is in doubt.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1559151.stm

Of course.....the United States is under the sign of cancer so lots of people here will be idiots and stay quiet....I of course prefer to question this sorry excuse for a government.

http://www.welfarestate.com/911/

posted June 09, 2005 11:48 PM              

what if lovely stood up for what she believed the same way she does now,,, but had been informed differently, and hterefore had a different view then she currently does .

posted June 10, 2005 09:49 AM              

Bye AG. *sigh* It was fun while it lasted, babe.

posted June 10, 2005 09:32 PM              

quote:

---

I don't know why you can't seem to get it through your head that the UN was placed in charge of the oil for food program. What about that do you not understand? The US had no responsibility for keeping the UN honest --jwhop

---

**********
The U.N. is Us
Exposing Saddam Hussein’s silent partner
Posted on Thursday, December 30, 2004. Originally from Harper's Magazine, December 2004. By Joy Gordon.
SourcesThe Bush Administration was still reeling from the revelations about Abu Ghraib prison this year when supporters of the President suddenly took note of a dramatic new scandal involving Iraq. “The richest rip-off in world history,” wrote William Safire; “fraud and deception that probably resulted in the deaths of thousands of Iraqis through malnutrition,” said Republican congressman Ralph Hall. The object of this ire was not Halliburton or any bungling by U.S. forces, nor was it a rogue nation or leader or any terrorist group. Instead, the loss of billions of dollars and countless Iraqi lives was laid at the feet of the United Nations.

“HOW HUSSEIN STOLE BILLIONS UNDER THE EYE OF THE U.N.’S OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM,” was the headline in the New York Times. In the hearings he chaired in July, Congressman Hall spoke of “the trail of corruption unfolding on the world stage,” and introduced a speaker whose book on the U.N. is entitled Inside the Asylum. In both houses of Congress, legislation calling for the withholding of U.N. dues is pending.

The current criticism is based mainly on an April report by the General Accounting Office, as well as on a list published in January by the Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada, identifying those who received vouchers to buy oil from Iraq. The heart of the GAO’s accusation is that “from 1997 through 2002 . . . the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues related to the Oil for Food program.” Most recently, the Duelfer report, commissioned by the CIA, provided a more detailed version of the accusations. Given the elaborate safeguards built into the Oil for Food Programme, critics argued, how could such a theft occur without complicity?

It may turn out that particular individuals in the U.N. did receive payoffs from Iraq in the form of oil vouchers. But fraudulent acts by individuals —in direct violation of their employer’s policies—are not the same thing as institutional failure. The U.N. barred employees from engaging in financial transactions with Iraq. And if Iraq’s government used the Oil for Food Programme to get cash under the table from its business partners, then we should look at who designed the program in the first place.

What seems to be consistently overlooked—not only by right-wing pundits but at congressional hearings and in the New York Times—is a distinction of enormous significance: the U.N. is being attacked for the policies and failures of particular member nations. The Oil for Food Programme was not some concoction of Kofi Annan’s. It was created by a vote of the members of the Security Council. And every aspect of how the program ran—what goods were allowed, the monitoring procedures, the transfer of funds, everything—was explicitly established by the members of the Security Council. Kofi Annan did not have a vote; but the United States and Britain did, and they approved of every resolution and decision that determined how the Oil for Food Programme worked. Whatever critics may say, “the U.N. bureaucracy” did not design a program that handed over cash to Saddam Hussein. The fifteen members of the Security Council—of which the United States was by far the most influential—determined how income from oil proceeds would be handled, and what the funds could be used for. The U.N.’s personnel operating the Oil for Food Programme did not set these policies. They simply executed the program that was designed by the members of the Security Council.

For the most part, the U.N. has not publicly defended itself. There is an internal investigation, led by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and U.N. staff are making few public comments until the investigation is complete. Ironically, if it is true that Saddam Hussein’s government smuggled and skimmed such vast amounts, much of the blame can be laid at the feet of the United States. For over a decade U.S. representatives have dominated decisions and actions regarding Iraq by the Security Council and its fifteen-member 661 Committee.[1] The committee operated by consensus, effectively giving each member veto power, a power the United States has made liberal use of. The United States is also on record as the committee member that most consistently and actively scrutinized Iraq’s dealings under the Oil for Food Programme. Scrutiny of the country’s physical borders—both land and sea—has also been dominated by the United States since the last Gulf War. Indeed, since then, no country has been in a better position to evaluate and control Iraq’s business.

Saddam Hussein smuggled $6 billion worth of oil out of Iraq, according to the General Accounting Office, much of it via tanker in the Persian Gulf. But the U.N. Multinational Interception Force (MIF)—charged with interdicting smuggling—turns out not to be a U.N. operation at all. The MIF came about when the Security Council passed a resolution in 1991 inviting any U.N. member country to interdict Iraqi oil smuggling in the Gulf, if the occasion arose. The result was the creation of a loose-knit collection of ships from various nations—all under the command of a United States officer from the Fifth Fleet. The commanders of the “U.N.” interception force have consisted entirely of a series of United States rear admirals or vice-admirals. And the ships taking part were almost all U.S. Navy vessels. Although twenty or so other countries participated, their contributions were minuscule compared with the U.S. role. In 2001, for example, Denmark contributed one ship for three months; U.S. participation that year involved ninety ships. In 2002, Poland contributed one ship for four months; U.S. participation involved ninety-nine ships. A few Arab countries participated in other ways. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait agreed to handle and dispose of ships that had been seized by the MIF. Britain’s role was a bit larger than most other countries’; Britons always served as deputy commanders. But even Britain’s role was dwarfed by that of the United States. In 2001 four British ships were involved, compared to the United States’ ninety.

The interception force was by all accounts quite active. It boarded hundreds of ships each year through 2001. In 2002, during the Bush Administration’s lead-up to the war, the MIF boarded over 3,000 ships, then did the same in 2003. The U.S. commander made annual reports to the 661 Committee. But that was the only involvement with the U.N., and the only U.N. body involved—not the secretary general, not “the U.N. bureaucracy,” just a committee of the fifteen nations that sat on the Security Council. If Hussein did indeed smuggle $6 billion worth of oil in “the richest rip-off in world history,” he didn’t do it with the complicity of the U.N. He did it on the watch of the U.S. Navy.

While the Fifth Fleet intercepted ships carrying illicit Iraqi oil, the U.S. position on overland oil smuggling to Jordan and Turkey was somewhat different: outright approval. In May 1991, under the first Bush Administration, as Iraq’s neighbors began to complain about the effects of the sanctions on their countries, the United States quietly decided to grant an informal “exemption” to Jordan, permitting it to import Iraqi oil in clear violation of the sanctions. This convenient arrangement continued for the next decade, with the blessing of three U.S. administrations. According to the Duelfer report, Iraq’s income from these arrangements with Jordan totaled some $4.4 billion. Turkey, like Jordan, complained that the sanctions were harming its economy. And Turkey, like Jordan, was a crucial ally the United States needed to appease. The result was a decision by the United States “to close our eyes to leakage via Turkey,” according to former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau. By 1997 the volume of oil being smuggled from Iraq to Turkey had grown to 1,000 trucks per day, transporting millions of tons of oil per year . . . all while U.S. planes enforcing no-fly zones flew overhead. Iraq’s illicit income from Turkey, according to the Duelfer report, came to $710 million.

* * *

About $1.5 billion of Hussein’s ill-gotten gains, according to the Duelfer report, came from kickbacks. The Iraqi regime is said to have worked out deals with manufacturers to buy goods at inflated prices—5 percent or 10 percent above market price—the seller then returning the difference under the table. It may well be that there were systematic kickbacks. But if there were, they didn’t happen for lack of oversight on the part of the U.N. The Oil for Food Programme had one of the most rigorous, elaborate systems of monitoring and verification imaginable. It was designed by the Security Council and implemented by the Secretariat. Before Iraq could purchase a single item—including food or medicine—it had to submit a detailed proposal for each six-month period, showing where the areas of greatest need were and how these purchases would address those needs. Each proposal was accompanied by a list, several hundred pages in length, of every single item and the quantity Iraq wanted to purchase, for every category that was in the proposal. U.N. staff then looked over the list, based on input from UNICEF and other U.N. agencies, to ensure that the list corresponded to the correct humanitarian priorities. Only then could Iraq sign a contract with a vendor to buy the approved goods. Once the contract was signed, it was circulated to the Office of Iraq Programme (OIP),[2] as well as UNSCOM (later UNMOVIC),[3] and the entire 661 Committee. Once the contract was approved, and the goods were shipped to Iraq, an independent inspection agent (first Lloyd’s Register and later Cotecna) inspected them on arrival. The Iraqi government then transported them to their destinations. If there were security concerns, the U.N. provided additional monitoring. Chlorine, for example, was essential to water purification, but it also could be used to produce chemical weapons. So UNICEF provided monitors who tracked every single chlorine canister from contracting through arrival in Iraq, including transport to its destination, installation in an approved facility, and then disposal of the empty canister. U.N. staff in Iraq also provided monitoring of the Oil for Food Programme as a whole, looking at equity, efficiency, and adequacy. Staff from UNICEF, the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme, the U.N. Development Programme, and other agencies conducted thousands of site visits to confirm that food was arriving in the villages where it was needed, that medical supplies were arriving at the clinics, and that school supplies, potable water, and agricultural supplies were being distributed properly.

This process gave every member of the Security Council the opportunity to review nearly every contract for Iraqi imports; and every member had the right to question any contract, to delay it, and to veto it. When the U.N. staff found that a price was suspiciously high, they asked the company for an explanation. If the explanation wasn’t satisfactory, they notified the 661 Committee, giving every member the opportunity to block or delay contracts to prevent kickbacks. On more than seventy occasions, the OIP told the committee it was concerned that a price was so high it might allow for kickbacks, and gave the committee all the documentation. In not a single instance did the United States choose to block any transaction due to suspected kickbacks.

It was not because the United States lacked information. Of the fifteen members on the committee, the United States took the job of examining and assessing Iraq’s dealings the most seriously, drawing on sixty technical experts to scrutinize contracts. The United States held up contracts for months, sometimes for years, asking questions again and again about the exact chemical makeup of medical-laboratory supplies, or how much weight a truck could carry, or whether or not a computer used a Pentium chip. Concerned about security, the United States blocked yogurt makers, child vaccines, ambulances, equipment for water purification, truck tires, electrical generators. . . In July 2002 alone, $5 billion of contracts for critical humanitarian supplies for Iraq were on hold—nearly all at the behest of the United States.

In examining contracts, “the U.S. and Britain were by far the most vigilant,” testified John Ruggie, a professor at Harvard University, at the Senate hearings on the accusations against the U.N. this year. Among the tens of thousands of contracts reviewed, “not one—not a single solitary one—was ever held up by any member on the grounds of pricing.” According to Ruggie, the United States and Britain “overlooked pricing irregularities in order to keep the sanctions regime in place and to put all their efforts into preventing dangerous technologies from getting into Saddam’s hands.”

* * *

How Iraq sold its oil was also under scrutiny, and the United States did act on what it perceived to be skimming by Hussein in these deals. The solution it enacted, however, succeeded in almost bankrupting the entire Oil for Food Programme within months.

In December 2000 the “oil overseers”—oil specialists appointed by the secretary general to monitor Iraq’s oil sales—reported to the 661 Committee that Iraq was setting its prices unusually low, and that this left room for cash payments under the table. Since the terms of the Oil for Food Programme required every single sale of Iraqi oil to be approved by every member of the Security Council, the United States and Britain came up with a novel solution. Instead of approving prices at the beginning of each sales period (usually a month), in accordance with normal commercial practices, the two allies would simply withhold their approval until after the oil was sold—creating a bizarre scenario in which buyers had to sign contracts without knowing what the price would be. The rationale was that this allowed the members of the 661 Committee to then set the price at the fair market value—as they determined it to be, weeks later. The oil overseers told the committee that this might stop the kickbacks but that it would be absolutely disastrous for the funding of the humanitarian goods. They offered a variety of other solutions, but the United States and Britain insisted on this one. And the results were in fact disastrous. Oil sales collapsed by 40 percent, and along with them the funds for critical humanitarian imports. On February 26, 2002, the director of the Oil for Food Programme informed the Security Council that $7 billion in urgent humanitarian contracts could not be paid for, because of the shortfall from the new pricing policies. The Oil for Food Programme, the lifeline for the entire Iraqi population, was badly compromised—not because Saddam Hussein had skimmed 5 percent or 10 percent but because the United States and Britain had adopted a punitive measure so extreme that it nearly bankrupted the entire program.

In the end, there may well have been smuggling, and there may well have been skimming at the margins of the Oil for Food Programme. But these did not occur for lack of oversight. The program’s elaborate structure of monitoring was simply unprecedented within the history of international governance. Every purchase was scrutinized for possible military uses. Every purchase was reviewed to ensure that it conformed to humanitarian priorities. Nine different U.N. humanitarian agencies were involved, as well as arms inspectors, as well as the Secretariat, as well as the entire Security Council. Every sale of oil, and every purchase of oil equipment and spare parts, was reviewed by the U.N.’s oil overseers, as well as every member of the Security Council. Hundreds of U.N. staff in Iraq monitored the arrival and distribution of goods, and were thoroughly involved in monitoring every aspect of Iraq’s economy and social services. In addition, under the terms of the Oil for Food Programme, the secretary general provided thorough, detailed reports to the Security Council every ninety days, for seven years. If the Iraqi government managed to misuse funds, it happened not because there was a lack of oversight but despite the most elaborate structure of oversight imaginable.

Saddam Hussein may well have ended up with more money in his pockets than he should have. Perhaps it was even in the billions. But little of the blame can credibly be laid at the feet of “the U.N. bureaucracy.” Far more of the fault lies with policies and decisions of the Security Council in which the United States played a central role. It is particularly ironic to hear the United States speak of the U.N. as a global center of corruption and incompetence. We might want to remember one occasion in particular when the U.N. exercised its responsibility for careful oversight. It was January of 2003, when Colin Powell insisted that Iraq was rife with weapons of mass destruction ready to be unleashed against Iraq’s neighbors, and against the United States. The Security Council would not authorize an invasion of Iraq. The members of the council wanted evidence, not speculation; and there wasn’t any, because there weren’t any weapons of mass destruction after all. Perhaps it is unsurprising that today the only role it seems the United States expects the U.N. to play in the continuing drama of Iraq is that of scapegoat.

About the Author
Joy Gordon, a professor of philosophy at Fairfield University, is completing a book about sanctions on Iraq. Her last article for Harper’s Magazine, “Cool War,” appeared in the November 2002 issue.

Notes
1. So called because of Security Council Resolution 661, which established the Iraq sanctions regime in 1990. [Back]

2. The OIP ran the Oil for Food Programme. [Back]

3. The U.N. Special Commission on Monitoring, replaced in 1999 by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, was mandated to disarm Iraq of its WMDs and to monitor any further developments or acquisitions. [Back]

This is The U.N. is Us, originally from December 2004, published Thursday, December 30, 2004. It is part of Features, which is part of Harpers.org.

posted June 13, 2005 12:56 AM              

quote:

---

Do you know what the war resolution passed by Congress actually said, that WMD was the smallest part of the joint resolution of Congress to authorize the President to use military force?--jwhop

---

IRAQ WAR RESOLUTION

107th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. J. RES. 114
October 10, 2002

JOINT RESOLUTION
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.
Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;

Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;

Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations';

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability , actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability , and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations; Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait ;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people; Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq ; Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction , the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so , and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);

Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677';

Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable'; Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States , as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'.

posted June 13, 2005 01:38 AM              

quote:

---

Pray you don't run into me on a site where I can really expand on my opinion of the whining, ankle biting, I hate America left. --jwhop

---

posted June 13, 2005 09:20 AM            

I feel a bit vindicated now. You answered the question he couldn't, namely:

If this was a humanitarian war and the Iraqi people suffered under the UN's Oil for Food program why didn't the US step in earlier and decry the Oil for Food program?

posted June 13, 2005 10:26 AM            

JOINT RESOLUTION
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;

Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;

Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations';

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability , actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability , and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations; Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait ;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people; Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq ; Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction , the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so , and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);

Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677';

Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable'; Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States , as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'.

SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to--
(1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and
(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that--
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. (a) REPORTS- The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338).
(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT- To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- To the extent that the information required by section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such resolution.
http://www.yourcongress.com/ViewArticle.asp?article_id=2686

posted June 13, 2005 10:53 AM            

The oil for food program was set up while Saddam was in power, set up to feed and otherwise relieve the suffering of Iraqi citizens. Saddam ripped the program off, building palaces and stuffing cash into every crack and crevice in Iraq, as well as bank accounts outside of Iraq. Saddam had a lot of outside help ripping off the program, including some French, Germans, Russians and of course, that entirely disreputable fly speck of humanity, George Galloway.

Hello, is there any intelligent life out there on the far radical left? Saddam was considered the legitimate leader of Iraq...by the UN and because that was so, aid to Iraq had of necessity to be delivered through his government...and not through direct aid to Iraqi citizens. Saddam made Iraqi citizens directly beholden to him for the very food they ate and the medicines they needed.

It's difficult to find a more asinine argument than the one which has America responsible for the oil for food program...administered through and by the United Nations, authorized by the 15 member nations of the UN Security Council.

Hello leftists of America; get a life, get a clue, find a brain and try to construct an argument that has some basis in reality. Difficult I know but being the disloyal opposition to America has worn out it welcome.

posted June 13, 2005 09:34 PM            

-----------------------
US 'backed illegal Iraqi oil deals'

Report claims blind eye was turned to sanctions busting by American firms

Julian Borger and Jamie Wilson in Washington
Tuesday May 17, 2005
The Guardian

The United States administration turned a blind eye to extensive sanctions-busting in the prewar sale of Iraqi oil, according to a new Senate investigation.

A report released last night by Democratic staff on a Senate investigations committee presents documentary evidence that the Bush administration was made aware of illegal oil sales and kickbacks paid to the Saddam Hussein regime but did nothing to stop them.

The scale of the shipments involved dwarfs those previously alleged by the Senate committee against UN staff and European politicians like the British MP, George Galloway, and the former French minister, Charles Pasqua.

In fact, the Senate report found that US oil purchases accounted for 52% of the kickbacks paid to the regime in return for sales of cheap oil - more than the rest of the world put together.

"The United States was not only aware of Iraqi oil sales which violated UN sanctions and provided the bulk of the illicit money Saddam Hussein obtained from circumventing UN sanctions," the report said. "On occasion, the United States actually facilitated the illicit oil sales.

The report is likely to ease pressure from conservative Republicans on Kofi Annan to resign from his post as UN secretary general.

The new findings are also likely to be raised when Mr Galloway appears before the Senate subcommittee on investigations today.

The Respect MP for Bethnal Green and Bow arrived yesterday in Washington demanding an apology from the Senate for what he called the "schoolboy dossier" passed off as an investigation against him.

"It was full of holes, full of falsehoods and full of value judgments that are apparently only shared here in Washington," he said at Washington Dulles airport.

He told Reuters: "I have no expectation of justice ... I come not as the accused but as the accuser. I am [going] to show just how absurd this report is."

Mr Galloway has denied allegations that he profited from Iraqi oil sales and will come face to face with the committee in what promises to be one of the most highly charged pieces of political theatre seen in Washington for some time.

Yesterday's report makes two principal allegations against the Bush administration. Firstly, it found the US treasury failed to take action against a Texas oil company, Bayoil, which facilitated payment of "at least $37m in illegal surcharges to the Hussein regime".

The surcharges were a violation of the UN Oil For Food programme, by which Iraq was allowed to sell heavily discounted oil to raise money for food and humanitarian supplies. However, Saddam was allowed to choose which companies were given the highly lucrative oil contracts. Between September 2000 and September 2002 (when the practice was stopped) the regime demanded kickbacks of 10 to 30 US cents a barrel in return for oil allocations.

In its second main finding, the report said the US military and the state department gave a tacit green light for shipments of nearly 8m barrels of oil bought by Jordan, a vital American ally, entirely outside the UN-monitored Oil For Food system. Jordan was permitted to buy some oil directly under strict conditions but these purchases appeared to be under the counter.

The report details a series of efforts by UN monitors to obtain information about Bayoil's oil shipments in 2001 and 2002, and the lack of help provided by the US treasury.

After repeated requests over eight months from the UN and the US state department, the treasury's office of foreign as sets control wrote to Bayoil in May 2002, requesting a report on its transactions but did not "request specific information by UN or direct Bayoil to answer the UN's questions".

Bayoil's owner, David Chalmers, has been charged over the company's activities. His lawyer Catherine Recker told the Washington Post: "Bayoil and David Chalmers [said] they have done nothing illegal and will vigorously defend these reckless accusations."

The Jordanian oil purchases were shipped in the weeks before the war, out of the Iraqi port of Khor al-Amaya, which was operating without UN approval or surveillance.

Investigators found correspondence showing that Odin Marine Inc, the US company chartering the seven huge tankers which picked up the oil at Khor al-Amaya, repeatedly sought and received approval from US military and civilian officials that the ships would not be confiscated by US Navy vessels in the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) enforcing the embargo.

Odin was reassured by a state department official that the US "was aware of the shipments and has determined not to take action".

The company's vice president, David Young, told investigators that a US naval officer at MIF told him that he "had no objections" to the shipments. "He said that he was sorry he could not say anything more. I told him I completely understood and did not expect him to say anything more," Mr Young said.

An executive at Odin Maritime confirmed the senate account of the oil shipments as "correct" but declined to comment further.

It was not clear last night whether the Democratic report would be accepted by Republicans on the Senate investigations committee.

posted June 13, 2005 09:59 PM            

Colin Rowat

(Colin Rowat is a lecturer in economics at the University of Birmingham, UK.)

August 2, 2001 (updated 14 November 2001)

Over May and June 2001, the US, British, French and Russian governments all proposed alterations to the eleven-year old UN sanctions on Iraq. Consensus was not reached, and the Security Council extended, unmodified, the Oil for Food program that allows Iraq to sell its oil to import civilian goods. As the extension expires in December, the proposals for reforming the sanctions are likely to resurface later this year. Since concerns about the sanctions often center on their harm to Iraqi civilians, the economic and humanitarian implications of the new proposals must be considered. The US-UK proposal -- officially promoted as "smart sanctions" -- may have some positive effects on civilian life, but it fails to address the current sanctions' major sources of harm. Sanctions, of course, intentionally harm to obtain political gains; what those gains might be is not considered here.

TWENTY YEARS OF TRAUMA

The past 20 years have been economically traumatic for Iraq. Almost the entire Iraqi gross domestic product in the 1980s was consumed by the 1980-88 war with Iran.[1] War's end fueled Iraqis' expectations of rising prosperity, but left the government deeply in debt, pursued by creditors and trying to absorb a large conscript army into a diminished and distorted civilian economy, dependent upon migrant labor and imports. The government's austerity program, undertaken to reduce its debt, exacerbated serious economic difficulties. Kuwait's violation of its OPEC quotas helped lower oil prices significantly throughout 1990, worsening the crisis. Iraq's subsequent invasion of Kuwait seems at least partly a desperate bid to stave off economic collapse, by boosting oil prices, securing new sources of revenue and signaling a tough bargaining stance to other regional creditors.

The gamble failed. Oil prices jumped 50 percent in August 1990 alone, but sanctions kept the windfall out of Iraq's coffers. ensuing Gulf war destroyed more of Iraq's civilian infrastructure than had years of war with Iran. A decade of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council has prevented any real economic recovery, both directly and by politicizing economic and humanitarian issues.

At first, the sanctions were nearly total. The Security Council granted exemptions only to import "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs".[2] The Iraqi government rejected a prototype 'oil for food' program later that year, in part because the proposed amounts of oil sales were insufficient to restore Iraqi social services to pre-war levels.[3] The Security Council consciously overrode then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's recommendation to permit larger sales. For the next five years, Iraq traded on a largely ad hoc basis, under a variety of arrangements approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. In 1996, unable to stop the worsening humanitarian crisis, the Iraqi government accepted a slightly larger Oil for Food program. The Security Council has extended the program since then, raising and then removing the cap on permitted oil sales, extending permissible imports to include oil industry spare parts and streamlining its procedures.

TODAY'S CONSTRAINTS

The sanctions directly reduce Iraq's potential exports and, hence, income. Non-oil exports are forbidden. As such exports accounted for a small share of Iraq's pre-sanctions exports, this prohibition may have a small effect. Nevertheless, it reduces income and employment, speeding the loss of skills among Iraq's workers and encouraging their emigration.

In theory, Oil for Food now permits unlimited oil exports. But in practice, the Iraqi oil industry has decayed under sanctions. Peak production under Oil for Food remains below the pre-sanctions peak (2.765 million barrels per day instead of 3.5 million) and cannot be sustained without large investments in equipment and skilled labor. Since 1998, Iraq's oil industry has ordered $2.5 billion of the $3.6 billion in spare parts allowed it, and received $953 million of them.[4] Given these limited inputs to date, UN oil experts report that the industry "continues to face significant technical and infrastructural problems, which unless addressed will inevitably result in the reduction of crude oil production from the current levels".[5]

The sanctions also cripple Iraq's once large public sector. Revenues from Iraq's nationalized oil industry once paid public sector salaries, something now forbidden. Increased smuggling and domestic taxes cannot fully offset this loss, in part because Iraq's domestic tax base remains small. As Iraq's military and security apparatus almost certainly are paid first from these funds, the rest of the public sector suffers the most from today's smaller budgets.

A partial solution would be to pay Iraq's public sector with 'oil for food' goods rather than cash; the Security Council would be unlikely to approve this. Alternatively, the Iraqi government could, and has, printed dinars to meet its obligations, but this spurs inflation.

The UN Secretary-General's Oil for Food reports hint at the effects. The most recent warned of "pronounced disincentives to the academic cadres," and noted that oil spare parts were piling up.[6] Poorly paid teachers and oil workers must supplement their small incomes, often at the expense of full attention to their formal jobs. Similar problems affect nurses, doctors, engineers, warehouse managers and other civil servants. Working without proper equipment, often part-time, their expensive skills decline. Some observers worry that the breakdown in formal employment is breeding a culture of opportunism and corruption.

CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

Civilian infrastructure has suffered disproportionately from lack of maintenance and investment. For example, Iraq's electrical sector is barely holding production steady at one third its 1990 capacity even though government expenditure in this sector consistently exceeds plans.[7] Electrical shortages, worst during the hot summers, spoil food and medicine and stop water purification, sewage treatment and irrigated agriculture, interfering with all aspects of life. Last summer, a power plant accident threatened a catastrophic failure of the national grid.[8]

In 1991, the UN estimated that Iraq's electrical sector needed $12 billion [9] ($16 billion in 2001 dollars [10] to return to pre-war levels. With depreciation and population growth, electrical repairs alone could consume much of the $31 billion that Oil for Food has generated for Iraq to date.[11] While the Iraqi government has occasionally curtailed its UN-approved oil sales and does have smuggling revenue, the point remains: Iraq's productive capacity is such that restoring its civilian infrastructure to pre-war levels will take a long time.

Foreign investment, which could speed reconstruction, is forbidden by sanctions. Even were it allowed, debt reduction would be necessary to attract investors. Estimates of Iraq's pre-sanctions external debts vary, but may now be $98 billion.[12] A further $23 billion in damages for invading Kuwait has been assessed; if the remaining $219 billion in claims are as successful as past claims were, they will add another $73 billion.[13] Even without the remaining claims, Iraq's debt is 380 percent of its GDP [14], surpassed only by Mozambique in the World Bank's ranking (which excludes Iraq).[15]

SANCTIONS BUSTED

Perhaps surprisingly, the sanctions do not seem to obstruct Iraq's import of civilian goods. Jordan, Turkey, Iran and Syria bypass UN controls. In Jordan's case, this dates to 1991, when independent economists found little price difference between Jordan and Iraq for wheat flour and other staple foods, meaning that it was not costly to import goods across their border. [16] Iraqi hardship is not a function of externally sealed borders, but of the factors raised above, such as poverty and destruction of civilian infrastructure. To impoverished Iraqis, the goods in Baghdad's shops may be as unattainable as if they were on display in Amman.

Smuggling is attractive to the extent that UN-permitted trade is not. For security and political reasons, the Sanctions Committee often places contracts for items that could be used to rebuild infrastructure on hold. Potential suppliers may face inexplicable delays of uncertain duration, interfering with their production plans. To ensure UN control of Iraq's oil funds, the Committee also removes commercial protection clauses from import contracts, leaving Iraq without recourse if a contract's terms are violated. The Iraqi government could reduce, but not remove, the commercial protection problem by contracting more with reputable, rather than politically expedient, suppliers.

Apart from the material harm done by sanctions, the perception that they are harmful is itself harmful, reducing Iraqis' expectations and therefore the government's incentives to meet them. Equally, the indirect nature of sanctions' harm reduces pressure on Security Council members to acknowledge responsibility for, and perhaps reduce, their harmfulness.

"SMART SANCTIONS"

The US-UK proposal [17] for self-proclaimed "smart sanctions" streamlines import procedures. Potential imports currently fall into one of three categories: goods subject to "fast track" approval, "dual-use" items and other non-military items. The Sanctions Committee handles items in the last two categories; the Office of the Iraq Program processes those in the first. The US-UK proposal abolishes the third category, dividing its domain between the remaining two. This plan would also tighten border controls to reduce smuggling.

Neither measure addresses the sanctions' principal means of harm. Its expansion of the "fast track" is economically beneficial but likely of limited significance: smuggling circumvented the sanctions as early as 1991. Although "fast track" procedures began in March 2000, their effect on the arrival of goods in Iraq is unknown. The effect may be small as the "fast track" has largely applied to goods not previously delayed by the Committee. Also, the expansion of the "dual-use" category may worsen matters, given the US history of using this category to block imports.

The proposed tightened borders could have detrimental effects on Iraqi civilians. As only 72 percent of Iraq's Oil for Food sales are used to meet civilian needs (25 percent going to compensation claims and 2.2 percent to UN expenses), converting smuggling to Oil for Food trade could reduce the money available to meet them. A smuggled dollar is also more flexible than an Oil for Food dollar: it can pay salaries and other cash expenses, and can avoid the UN's potentially costly procedures. These concerns can almost certainly be dismissed: smuggled oil is usually sold at a discount, reducing the money that it generates for Iraq; regime members, rather than the public, receive much of the ensuing revenue; and reputable foreign companies may avoid smuggling.

There is a more likely side effect of reduced smuggling: Iraq's Kurdish regional authorities risk losing revenue gained by smuggling diesel from south-central Iraq to Turkey. However, as the Turkish and Iraqi governments are discussing a direct trade route, this may occur independently of UN proposals.

If, in spite of these drawbacks, the US and UK successfully present their proposal as ending sanctions' harm, the Iraqi government may face heightened expectations to alleviate civilian suffering. Presumably, the US and UK would then face less pressure to lighten sanctions' burden.

The US-UK proposal's economic and humanitarian consequences are highly uncertain, but unlikely to be large. The French proposal [18] goes further in reducing the sanctions' economic constraints: it would give Iraq's oil industry cash to pay salaries and would permit foreign investment; it sidelines tightening of the borders. The Russian proposal [19] suspends all non-military sanctions once weapons inspectors return to Iraq. For better or worse, this proposal goes furthest towards ending the sanctions' restrictions.

--------------------
The author can be contacted at c.rowat@bham.ac.uk. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the University of Birmingham.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Alnasrawi, Abbas. The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1950-2010. Greenwood Press, 1994. p. 100.

[2] Security Council Resolution 661. gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s90/15, 6 August 1990. ¶ 3(c).

[3] S/2279. Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by a mission led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, http://www.casi.org.uk/overflow/undocs/sadruddin1.pdf, 15 July 1991. ¶ 26.

[4] Office of the Iraq Programme. Weekly Update (20 – 26 October 2001), http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/latest/wu30Oct01.html, 30 October 2001 for data on oil spare parts ordered and arrived. The total allowed oil spare parts allowed Iraq are $300 million per phase in Phases IV and V and $600 million per phase in Phases VI to X.

[5] S/2001/566. Report of the team of experts established pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1330 (2000), http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/s2001_566.pdf, 6 June 2001.

[6] S/2001/505. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1330 (2000), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/505e.pdf, 18 May 2001.

[7] S/2001/505. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1330 (2000), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/505e.pdf, 18 May 2001. ¶ 90.

[8] S/2000/857. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1302 (2000), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/857e.pdf, 8 September 2000. ¶ 36.

[9] S/22799. Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by a mission led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, http://www.casi.org.uk/overflow/undocs/sadruddin1.pdf, 15 July 1991. In 1997-1998 the UNDP and the Iraqi Commission of Electricity discussed a figure of $7 billion. This figure was later included in S/1998/90 (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s199890.htm), a 1 February 1998 supplementary report on Oil for Food. The author’s UN sources suspect that the 1991 estimate is more accurate.

[10] 2001 figure generated with the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ consumer price index calculator at http://www.bls.gov/cpi.

[11] S/2001/919. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1360 (2001), http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/S2001_919.pdf, 28 September 2001. Data from paragraphs 2(a), (b) of Annex I; euros converted to dollars at 31 August 2001 rates.

[12] In a report submitted on 29 April 1991 by the Iraqi government to the UN Secretary-General the former declared its external debts to be $42.1 billion as of 31 December 1990 and its annualised interest rate to be eight percent (reprinted in Middle East Economic Survey 13 May 1991, D6 - D9). These data had not previously been published by the Iraqi government, nor have they since. If they are correct, and assuming an unchanged interest rate, Iraq's external debt would have grown to $98 billion by 31 December 2001. Inclusion of loans from Arab Gulf states, which the Iraqi government declared to have been grants, would increase this figure. Recognition that some of Iraq's debt may have been surreptitiously serviced under the sanctions would decrease it. Another confound is Iraqi government interest in overstating its foreign liabilities: these data were presented to support the Iraqi government's claim that Iraq's economy was unable to both service its debt and meet basic humanitarian needs within Iraq.

Abbas Alnasrawi, working from the same data, estimates Iraq's current external debt to be $120 billion (“Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future”, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/alnasrawi.html, 11 March 2001). The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates its foreign debt to be $53 billion in 2000.

[13] UN Compensation Commission. http://www.unog.ch/uncc/status.htm, 24 October 2001 version. The figure of $73 billion is calculated by the author by assuming that the past award rate in each category of claims will continue into the future.

[14] The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates Iraq's nominal GDP at $31.8 billion in 2000 (http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Structure).

[15] World Development Indicators. Net present value of external debt as percentage of GDP (http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/psd/compete.nsf/27aa33e6034bee39852564900064e573?OpenView). 1996, 1997 data. Mozambique's ratio is 441%.

[16] Drèze, Jean and Haris Gazdar. “Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991”, World Development, 20 (7), pp. 921-945, 1992.

[17] 20 June 2001 draft, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/ukdraftscr010620.html.

[18] 19 June 2001 draft, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/france010619a.html.

posted June 13, 2005 10:12 PM            

Tell me again how Bin Laden wasn't able to point to the state of affairs in Iraq when amassing his terrorist army.

posted June 13, 2005 11:22 PM              

************

January 26, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.

The policy of “containment” of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam’s secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons.

Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.

We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts. Although we are fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk.

Sincerely,

Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett

Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula Dobriansky

Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad

William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman

Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin Weber

Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

***********

now look here at the lists of other pnac members.....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_for_the_New_American_Century

posted June 13, 2005 11:44 PM              

Not my birthday

------------------

posted June 13, 2005 11:46 PM            

quote:

---

The United States administration turned a blind eye to extensive sanctions-busting in the prewar sale of Iraqi oil, according to a new Senate investigation.

---

quote:

---

A report released last night by Democratic staff on a Senate investigations committee presents documentary evidence that the Bush administration was made aware of illegal oil sales and kickbacks paid to the Saddam Hussein regime but did nothing to stop them. The scale of the shipments involved dwarfs those previously alleged by the Senate committee against UN staff and European politicians like the British MP, George Galloway, and the former French minister, Charles Pasqua.

---

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In fact, the Senate report found that US oil purchases accounted for 52% of the kickbacks paid to the regime in return for sales of cheap oil - more than the rest of the world put together. "The United States was not only aware of Iraqi oil sales which violated UN sanctions and provided the bulk of the illicit money Saddam Hussein obtained from circumventing UN sanctions," the report said. "On occasion, the United States actually facilitated the illicit oil sales. The report is likely to ease pressure from conservative Republicans on Kofi Annan to resign from his post as UN secretary general. The new findings are also likely to be raised when Mr Galloway appears before the Senate subcommittee on investigations today. The Respect MP for Bethnal Green and Bow arrived yesterday in Washington demanding an apology from the Senate for what he called the "schoolboy dossier" passed off as an investigation against him. "It was full of holes, full of falsehoods and full of value judgments that are apparently only shared here in Washington," he said at Washington Dulles airport. He told Reuters: "I have no expectation of justice ... I come not as the accused but as the accuser. I am [going] to show just how absurd this report is." Mr Galloway has denied allegations that he profited from Iraqi oil sales and will come face to face with the committee in what promises to be one of the most highly charged pieces of political theatre seen in Washington for some time.

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Yesterday's report makes two principal allegations against the Bush administration. Firstly, it found the US treasury failed to take action against a Texas oil company, Bayoil, which facilitated payment of "at least $37m in illegal surcharges to the Hussein regime". The surcharges were a violation of the UN Oil For Food programme, by which Iraq was allowed to sell heavily discounted oil to raise money for food and humanitarian supplies. However, Saddam was allowed to choose which companies were given the highly lucrative oil contracts. Between September 2000 and September 2002 (when the practice was stopped) the regime demanded kickbacks of 10 to 30 US cents a barrel in return for oil allocations. In its second main finding, the report said the US military and the state department gave a tacit green light for shipments of nearly 8m barrels of oil bought by Jordan, a vital American ally, entirely outside the UN-monitored Oil For Food system. Jordan was permitted to buy some oil directly under strict conditions but these purchases appeared to be under the counter. The report details a series of efforts by UN monitors to obtain information about Bayoil's oil shipments in 2001 and 2002, and the lack of help provided by the US treasury. After repeated requests over eight months from the UN and the US state department, the treasury's office of foreign as sets control wrote to Bayoil in May 2002, requesting a report on its transactions but did not "request specific information by UN or direct Bayoil to answer the UN's questions". Bayoil's owner, David Chalmers, has been charged over the company's activities. His lawyer Catherine Recker told the Washington Post: "Bayoil and David Chalmers [said] they have done nothing illegal and will vigorously defend these reckless accusations." The Jordanian oil purchases were shipped in the weeks before the war, out of the Iraqi port of Khor al-Amaya, which was operating without UN approval or surveillance. Investigators found correspondence showing that Odin Marine Inc, the US company chartering the seven huge tankers which picked up the oil at Khor al-Amaya, repeatedly sought and received approval from US military and civilian officials that the ships would not be confiscated by US Navy vessels in the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) enforcing the embargo.

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Odin was reassured by a state department official that the US "was aware of the shipments and has determined not to take action". The company's vice president, David Young, told investigators that a US naval officer at MIF told him that he "had no objections" to the shipments. "He said that he was sorry he could not say anything more. I told him I completely understood and did not expect him to say anything more," Mr Young said. An executive at Odin Maritime confirmed the senate account of the oil shipments as "correct" but declined to comment further. It was not clear last night whether the Democratic report would be accepted by Republicans on the Senate investigations committee. The Pentagon declined to comment. The US representative's office at the UN referred inquiries to the state department, which fail to return calls.

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If the radical left weren't such slow learners, it wouldn't be necessary to repeat that the US had no authority over the oil for food program, no responsibility for who Saddam sold his oil too...and in fact, it was Saddam who negotiated with the UN to get the authority to choose who he would sell to and Saddam made those decisions. He also made the decisions as to who he could and would bribe....which included senior UN officials, at least one French and one English politician and various individuals in business in Europe...the purpose of which was to have these people agitate for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Worked well too since Galloway seemed to understand what was expected for the bribe he was paid and fulfilled his end of the bargain....in that he constantly bad mouthed the sanctions.

Now, if anyone at the UN can back up the big mouths of the dimocrats with some proof of Bush administration complicity in sanction busting in any area where the US was in control and not the UN, then maybe you've got something. Watch it fizzle out and slide under the waters as all the other dimocrat initiatives have.

posted June 14, 2005 12:00 AM            

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How the Sanctions Hurt Iraq Colin Rowat(Colin Rowat is a lecturer in economics at the University of Birmingham, UK.)August 2, 2001 (updated 14 November 2001)

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Yes, we all understand Saddam was a bad man...all except you Acoustic and those on the radical left, those who moved heaven and earth to keep him in power in Iraq.

Now, it wasn't the oil for food program that caused Saddam to go to war with Iran and spend all those billions on weapons instead of food and staple goods for Iraqi citizens.

And it wasn't the oil for food program which caused Saddam to build all those palaces with the oil for food money and stash the rest in banks around the world...those billions which he didn't keep on hand for getaway cash.

And it wasn't the US who made Saddam invade Kuwait and get Iraq hit with a big bill for his trouble...along with getting thousands of his citizens killed by coalition forces.

And it wasn't the US who made Saddam neglect his oil fields, electric grids and let everything else fall apart in Iraq. It wasn't the sanctions either. Saddam made a conscious decision to spend the money elsewhere.

Why is it Acoustic that you wish to place the blame for Saddam's theft, murder, neglect of his own citizens and neglect of his country's main asset on everyone but Saddam Hussein?

posted June 14, 2005 12:17 AM            

Or do you not believe the war resolution I posted is authentic?

Or is that you just don't comprehend what the words actually mean?

posted June 14, 2005 12:34 AM            

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The above is from: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080201.html
Tell me again how Bin Laden wasn't able to point to the state of affairs in Iraq when amassing his terrorist army.

Oh, also reitterate if you would the humanitarian concern prior to removing Saddam, and why that concern was never levied [by Americans] on the US's involvement in the Oil for Food program.

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The concern for Iraqi citizens was spelled out in the war resolution. The resolution passed prior to removing Saddam Hussein.

If you're not reading what's posted or are intellectually incapable of understanding the words, then you will continue to harp on a dead issue you've raised...several times and which I've answered each time.

It is simply absurd to state bin Laden's issue was the welfare of the Iraqi citizens. Iraqi citizens who bin Laden's terrorist buddies are now killing indiscriminately.

Your proposition is so absurd as to be out of touch with reality. If bin Laden had any concern for Iraqi citizens, he would have killed Saddam Hussein who starved, tortured, murdered and brutally repressed those same Iraqi citizens for more than 20 years.

When is that bolt of lightning going to strike you Acoustic...and wake you up to the fact you are making nonsense arguments?

posted June 14, 2005 12:35 AM              

jwhop.....
i read that resolution when it was passed lol
im not aware of you ever posting the whole thing......
that resolution would have never passed if it were about freeing the iraqis.....
that resolution centered around wmd threat and international terrorism.....

it actually classifies brutal repression and stealing kuwaiti property together........as 'among other things'.....right from the start......

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

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Do you know what the war resolution passed by Congress actually said, that WMD was the smallest part of the joint resolution of Congress to authorize the President to use military force?--jwhop

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